# 1NC

### FW

#### Debates should center on whether the United States federal government should expand antitrust law.

#### The “USFG” is three branches.

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Its is possessive

Macmillan Dictionary

[“its”, Macmillan Dictionary, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/its, accessed 8-15-15, AFB]

Its is the possessive form of it.

#### Contextually, “expand the scope” means regulate additional anticompetitive behaviors

Cox ’19 [Kate, staff, “Antitrust 101: Why Everyone Is Probing Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Google,” ARS TECHNICA, 11—5—19,

<https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/11/antitrust-101-why-everyone-is-probing-amazon-apple-facebook-and-google/>, accessed 6-2-21]

The Clayton Act expanded the scope of antitrust law to deal not just with monopolies, but specifically with anticompetitive behavior—basically, tactics that unfairly boost a company into a dominant market position or that unfairly keep a dominant company at the top and suppress competitors. At the highest level, these behaviors basically fall into two big buckets.

The first is growth through acquisition: you can't just buy out your primary competitor if the field isn't big enough for other companies to pose real competition. Consider the mobile market, for example: regulators decided the imminent union of Sprint and T-Mobile isn't anticompetitive, because T-Mobile and Sprint are the two smallest of the four major players. Even with one of them taken out, the market still has three national carriers. (And under the agreement with regulators, there will theoretically be a fourth carrier again.

But if AT&T and Verizon, the two dominant US mobile carriers by far, ever tried to merge operators, even the current crop of business-friendly regulators would almost certainly bring that proposal to a screeching halt. A deal of that magnitude would create a company so far beyond the reach of any potential competitor that no current player or new business could ever reasonably be expected to stand a chance of catching up.

The second metaphorical bucket holds the whole category of dominance through unfair dealings, which can be done by one company or as an agreement among several. One kind of unlawful anticompetitive behavior you find here is classic price-fixing. Recently, for example, StarKist was ordered to pay a $100 million fine after it and Bumble Bee were both found guilty of conspiring to fix prices in the canned tuna market, which is largely controlled by three companies.

Unfair behavior can also include a whole array of tactics undertaken by a single company, such as price discrimination, predatory pricing, or certain kinds of exclusivity requirements. These are the kinds of behaviors a federal judge found Qualcomm guilty of back in May, when she ruled that the company's business practices "strangled competition" with exclusive deals and patent licensing fees that charged device makers even when their products used a different brand of chip.

#### Prohibition is law forbidding action

Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary editor-in-chief, 16

[Bryan A., Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Pocket Edition, “prohibition”, p. 630]

prohibition. (15c) 1. A law or order than forbids a certain action.

#### Prefer our interpretation-

#### Limits---Not defending topical action unlimits the topic to anything being topical and stacks the deck against the neg from the start- fairness is a prior question because it determines our ability to engage.

#### Predictable Clash---Their interp moots pre-tournament research and strategy--- that’s key for argument refinement—which is inherently valuable and makes us more capable advocates-

#### Switch side debate enables reflexive openness and solves all of their offense --- reading it on the negative encourages empathetic learning and incorporates all sorts of different literature bases in to debates about topical affirmatives --- net benefit is linear thinking and meaningful engagement.

#### Debating against a well-prepared opponent makes us better advocates, making it more likely your ideas will be accepted---resolutional focus fosters the best form of disagreements by ensuring teams research the most persuasive version of their ideas while bolstering critical reflection and breaking down dogmatic beliefs

Conor Friedersdorf 17 is a staff writer at The Atlantic, The Highest Form of Disagreement: The best way to argue is to take on your opponents’ strongest arguments, not their weakest ones, 7-26-17, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/the-highest-form-of-disagreement/531597/>, y2k

And I want more Americans who demand these kinds of debates for the sake of our democracy. Just ideas against ideas, let them fight it out, and if you lose, come back with better ideas. Tony was right. A rumble can be clenched by a fair fight if you've got the guts to risk that. Are millions of Americans ready to start fighting fair for the sake of our democracy? For the sake of solving common problems we all face? Listening to those remarks Sunday at the Aspen Ideas Festival, which is co-hosted by The Aspen Institute and The Atlantic, I shared the speaker’s frustration with attacks on people rather than ideas, which pervade so much of today’s political discourse. And yet, I would add something to his analysis: ad hominem is a problem, but if you watch cable news, or follow Twitter, or reflect on the way that Donald Trump engages with Democrats, or Democrats with other Republicans, you notice a style of argument every bit as pernicious. It consists of constantly elevating the very worst of the other side, attacking only the weakest rather than the strongest part or version of the ideas held by the other political party or ideological tribe or cultural identity group. As Scott Alexander puts it, “The straw man is a terrible argument nobody really holds, which was only invented so your side had something easy to defeat. The weak man is a terrible argument that only a few unrepresentative people hold, which was only brought to prominence so your side had something easy to defeat.” Tucker Carlson is a master of the weak man––as was Jon Stewart. And America would benefit if our culture of argument elevated the opposite approach, steel-manning, “the art of addressing the best form of the other person’s argument, even if it’s not the one they presented.” Here’s Chana Messinger extolling it in one of those great old-school blog posts that I am honored just to honor: We probably know best which arguments are most difficult for our position, because we know our belief’s real weak points and what kind of evidence we tend to find compelling … use that information to look for ways to make their arguments better, more difficult for you to counter. This is the highest form of disagreement. If you know of a better counter to your own argument, say so. If you know of evidence that supports their side, bring it up. If their argument rests on an untrue piece of evidence, talk about the hypothetical case in which they were right... Because if you can’t respond to that better version, you’ve got some thinking to do, even if you are more right than the person you’re arguing with. In short, she says, “Think more deeply than you’re being asked to.” And bear these fruits: First, people like having their arguments approached with care and serious consideration. Steelmanning requires that we think deeply about what’s being presented to us and find ways to improve it. By addressing the improved version, we show respect and honest engagement to our interlocutor. People who like the way you approach their arguments are much more likely to care about what you have to say about those arguments… Second, people are more convinced by arguments which address the real reason they reject your ideas rather than those which address those aspects less important to their beliefs. Coming full circle to our NPR host’s project, Messinger argues that “steel-personning ~~steelmanning~~ makes you a better person. It makes you more charitable, forcing you to assume, at least for a moment, that the people you’re arguing with, much as you ferociously disagree with them or even dislike them, are people who might have something to teach you. It makes you more compassionate, learning to treat those you argue with as true opponents, not merely obstacles. It broadens your mind, preventing us from making easy dismissals or declaring preemptive victory, pushing us to imagine all the things that could and might be true in this beautiful, strange world of ours. And it keeps us rational, reminding us that we’re arguing against ideas, not people, and that our goal is to take down these bad ideas, not to revel in the defeat of incorrect people.” It’s only just out of reach.

#### You should privilege rigorous debate over different political paradigms over endorsing any one political paradigm. Unflinching commitments ignore the complexity and partiality of any political theory. Promoting clash is key to interrogate complex issues, problematize solutions, and actualize any benefits of debate.

Tully ‘2 – Jackman Chari of Philosophical Studies at Toronto (James, Political Philosophy as Critical Activity, Political Theory 30 (4) p. 544-546)

Accordingly, understanding and clarifying political concepts, whether by citizens or philosophers, will always be a form of practical reasoning, of entering into and clarifying the ongoing exchange of reasons over the uses of our political vocabulary. It will not be the theoretical activity of abstracting from everyday use and making explicit the context-independent rules for the correct use of our concepts in every case, for the conditions of possibility for such a metacontextual political theory are not available. When political philosophers enter into political discussions and disputes to help clarify the language being used and the appropriate procedures for exchanging reasons, as well as to present reasons of their own, they are not doing anything different in kind from the citizens involved in the argumentation, as the picture of political reflection as a theoretical enterprise would lead us to believe. Political philosophy is rather the methodological extension and critical clarification of the already reflective and problematised character of historically situated practices of practical reasoning.'8 Thus, we can now see why the first step should be to start from the ways the concepts we take up are actually used in the practices in which the political difficulties arise. Here we 'bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use' to ensure that the work of philosophy starts from 'the rough ground' of struggles with and over words rather than from uncritically accepted forms of representation of them, which may result in 'merely tracing round the frame through which we look at' them. '9 On this view, contemporary political theories are approached, not as rival comprehensive and exclusive theories of the contested concepts, but as limited and often complementary accounts of the complex uses (senses) of the concepts in question and the corresponding aspects of the problematic practice to which these senses refer. They extend and clarify the practical exchange of reasons over the problematic practice of governance by citizens, putting forward a limited range of academic reasons, analogies, and examples for employing criteria in such-and-such a way, for showing why these considerations outweigh those of other theorists, and so on (often of course with the additional claim that these limited uses transcend practice and legis- late legitimate use). A theory clarifies one range of uses of the concepts in question and corresponding aspects of the practice of government and puts forward reasons for seeing this as decisive. Yet there is always the possibility of reasonable disagreement, of other theories bringing to attention other senses of the word and other aspects of the situation that any one theory unavoidably overlooks or downplays. Political theories are thus seen to offer conditional perspectives on the whole broad complex of languages, relations of power, forms of subjectivity, and practices of freedom to which they are addressed. None of these theories tells us the whole truth, yet each provides an aspect of the complex picture.20 This first form of survey enables readers (and authors) to understand critically both the problem and the proposed solutions. It enables us to see the reasons and redescriptions on the various sides; to grasp the contested criteria for their application, the circumstances in which they can be applied, and the considerations that justify their different applications, thereby passing freely from one sense of the concept to another and from one aspect of the practice to another; and to appreciate the partial and relative merits of each proposal. To have acquired the complex linguistic abilities to do this is literally to have come to understand critically the concepts in question. This enables us to enter into the discussions of the relative merits of the proposed solutions our- selves and present and defend our own views on the matter. To have mastered this dialogical technique is to have acquired the 'burdens of judgment' (in a broader sense than Rawls's use of this phrase is normally interpreted) or what Nietzsche called the ability to reason 'perspectivally'.21 This form of practical reasoning is also a descendent of the classical humanist view of political philosophy as a practical dialogue. Because it is always possible to invoke a reason and redescribe the accepted application of our political concepts (paradiastole), it is always necessary to learn to listen to the other side (audi alteram partem), to learn the conditional arguments that support the various sides (in utramque partem), and so to be prepared to enter into deliberations with others on how to negotiate an agreeable solution (negotium).22

### K

#### Capitalism transforms individuals into ‘Nobodys’ --- that creates the fundamental conditions for State violence. Our critique doesn’t deny the importance of identity; rather we should begin with a critique of capitalism because class mediates oppression.

Hill 16— Distinguished Professor of African American Studies at Morehouse College [Marc Lamont, *Nobody, Casualties of America’s War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and Beyond*, p. 17-20]

To be Nobody is to be abandoned by the State. For decades now, we have witnessed a radical transformation in the role and function of government in America. An obsession with free-market logic and culture has led the political class to craft policies that promote private interests over the public good. As a result, our schools, our criminal justice system, our military, our police departments, our public policy, and virtually every other entity engineered to protect life and enhance prosperity have been at least partially relocated to the private sector. At the same time, the private sector has kept its natural commitment to maximizing profits rather than investing in people. This arrangement has left the nation’s vulnerable wedged between the Scylla of negligent government and the Charybdis of corporate greed, trapped in a historically unprecedented state of precarity.

To be Nobody is to be considered disposable. In New Orleans, we saw the natural disaster of Hurricane Katrina followed by a grossly unnatural government response, one that killed thousands of vulnerable citizens and consigned many more to refugee status. In Flint, Michigan, we are witnessing this young century’s most profound illustration of civic evil, an entire city collectively punished with lead-poisoned water for the crime of being poor, Black, and politically disempowered. Every day, the nation’s homeless, mentally ill, drug addicted, and poor are pushed out of institutions of support and relocated to jails and prisons. These conditions reflect a prevailing belief that the vulnerable are unworthy of investment, protection, or even the most fundamental provisions of the social contract. As a result, they can be erased, abandoned, and even left to die.

Without question, Nobodyness is largely indebted to race, as White supremacy is foundational to the American democratic experiment. The belief that White lives are worth more than others—what Princeton University scholar Eddie Glaude calls the “value gap”—continues to color every aspect of our public and private lives.1 This belief likewise compromises the lives of vulnerable White citizens, many of who support political movements and policies that close ranks around Whiteness rather than ones that enhance their own social and economic interests.

While Nobodyness is strongly tethered to race, it cannot be divorced from other forms of social injustice. Instead, it must be understood through the lens of “intersectionality,” the ways that multiple forms of oppression operate simultaneously against the vulnerable.2 It would be impossible to example the 2014 killing of Mya Hall by National Security Agency police without understanding how sexism and transphobia conspire with structural racism to endanger Black trans bodies. We cannot make sense of Sandra Bland’s tragic death without recognizing the impact of gender and poverty in shaping the current carceral state. To understand the complexity of oppression, we must avoid simple solutions and singular answers.

Despite the centrality of race within American life, Nobodyness cannot be understood without an equally thorough analysis of class. Unlike other forms of difference, class creates the material conditions and relations through which racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression are produced, sustained, and lived. This does not mean that all forms of injustice are due to class antagonism, nor does it mean that all forms of domination can be automatically fixed through universal class struggle. Rather, it means that we cannot begin to address the various forms of oppression experienced by America’s vulnerable without radically changing a system that defends class at all costs.

This book is my attempt to tell these stories of those marked as Nobody. Based on extensive research, as well as my time on the ground—in Ferguson, Baltimore, New York City, Atlanta, Hempstead, Flint, and Sanford—I want to show how the high-profile and controversial cases of State violence that we’ve witnessed over the past few years are but a symptom of a deeper American problem. Underneath each case is a more fundamental set of economic conditions, political arrangements, and power relations that transforms everyday citizens into casualties of an increasingly intense war on the vulnerable. It is my hope that this book offers an analysis that spotlights the humanity of these “Nobodies” and inspires principled action.

#### Self-care is a product of neoliberalism, produces violent forms of disciplining, and results in the hypervaluation of black women which turns the efficacy of the aff.

Mitchell 13—Assistant Professor, Feminist Studies Department, Critical Race and Ethnics Studies, U.C. Santa Cruz [Nick, “On Audre Lorde’s Legacy and the “Self” of Self-Care, Part 2 of 3,” May 14, 2013, http://www.lowendtheory.org/post/50428216600/on-audre-lordes-legacy-and-the-self-of]

Audre Lorde didn’t die a natural death. She died an institutionally produced one, a death that was generated at the level of social infrastructure. I want us to learn to regard Audre Lorde’s death as an effect of racial capitalism—its fundamentally unequal provisioning of wealth and social goods, its ableist and productivist standards as to what constitutes a healthy person, its fashioning of health care as a private commodity rather than as a fundamental right, and its particular commingling of sexism and racism that at one and the same time materializes the constant demand that black women work and renders the work they do invisible. The conditions that produced Audre Lorde’s death, in other words, might also serve as a reminder that in the aggregate, black women bear a disproportionate share of racial capitalism’s propensity to work its workers to death. And a major feature of these death-making conditions is to be found in the ways in which it is structured so as to refuse to recognize as work what so many black women do for themselves, for each other, and for their communities—this may include but is not limited to the largely unwaged work of cooking, cleaning, raising, educating, and caring for children and adults in its myriad forms. (This is the work, to paraphrase part of the most overlooked chapter of Angela Davis’s Women, Race, and Class, that no one notices until it’s not done.)

To reiterate, these death-making conditions serve as a motor for racial capitalism not only through the erasure, devaluation, and naturalization of life-making and life-sustaining (also called "reproductive”) work that women are expected to learn to do, to do, and to love doing,[1] but also because through the erasure of “women’s work” as work, they serve to compel and coerce workers to accept waged labor above and beyond the work they already perform. This compulsion and coercion regularly takes the form of the form of the stigmatization and surveillance of poor people and poor women especially, who use governmental assistance to survive. And again, here, black women bear the brunt of the burden of capitalism’s stigmatization of the poor (of color). "Welfare,“ as Dorothy Roberts puts it, "has become a code word for race.” By which she means: a code word for blackness. Think here of the sheer prominence of the “welfare queen” stereotype (and its deployment to make common sense out of the notion that black women who use governmental assistance are parasitic on the social body). Think here, also, how the racializing and gendering of that stereotype authorizes the constant surveillance to which welfare recipients are regularly and systematically subjected, surveillance whose purpose it is to call into doubt the ability of welfare recipients to make fitting choices in deciding how and what to feed themselves (and those that depend upon them), how and what they should consume.

It matters that Audre Lorde, by virtue of a class mobility that materialized in the form of advanced degrees, international recognition and renown, and semi-stable employment with what were clearly circumscribed “health benefits,” may have been able to escape the worst of the state-sanctioned, Reaganomics-fueled state surveillance directed towards poor black women.[2] And it also matters that the racializing and gendering project of the capitalism that underwrites that surveillance also shaped the conditions in which she lived and died in ways that are too rarely recognized. We in the U.S. left are well trained to express outrage when black lives are stolen in spectacular events—not only in the assassinations of “our” Malcolms and Martins, but even in the executions of our less famed Emmetts and Oscars and Trayvons. Yet we are not always best equipped to organize against the politics that produce deaths not in spectacular (and regular), direct, face-to-face expressions of violence but rather, through other, less readily visible, rhythms and structures of everyday life. To ask that we regard Audre Lorde’s death as the outcome of a politics (and not just a disease) is both to invoke Lorde less as an exceptional figure than as a powerfully exemplary one, and to direct our attention to how the murderousness of capitalism expresses itself where it is most mundane.[3]

Mundane murderousness, slow death (which may in many cases not be slow at all), has taken institutional form in part as a consequence of the consolidation of health care as a for-profit industry that defines health as the capacity to work. “Health,” in this context, is measured by the health of racial capitalism. Such a definition means that being healthy is understood as having the capacity to optimize your ability to be exploited. No medical leave, then, for the English prof who’s battling cancer. No capacity, then, to decide for herself what her health needs are and to act on that decision—the social infrastructure of neoliberalism has already coded giving its workers that much freedom, that kind of autonomy, as an unaffordable extravagance.

Care as extravagance. Historically speaking, it is here, in the Reagan era, that the “self” of self-care emerged. Donald Vickery and James Fries’s bestseller Take Care of Yourself: A Consumer’s Guide to Medical Care was published in 1981, and formed part of a larger explosion of “self-help” publications that encouraged a readership increasingly clobbered by a neoliberal assault—against liveable wages, workers rights, social services, and the welfare state writ large—to take it upon themselves to manage the consequences of that clobbering. And I would argue that the “self” of self-care came into being precisely as an effect of that management, as well as of the clobbering that both preceded and accompanied it. It euphemizes as a goodwill gesture (the benevolent “take care of yourself!”) an imperative that, if elaborated, looks much more like a relation of coercion and discipline (“take care of yourself or your job will go to someone who does”; “take care of yourself lest you fall ill and get saddled with medical debt”; “take care of yourself because you have no right to expect that society will”; “take care of yourself…or else”). The self of self-care, all of this is to say, has a history that should serve as a caution toward attempts to make self-care an unqualified good. It is a self that is specifically calibrated as a defensive reaction to the combination of austerity politics with reinvigorated forms of gendered racism that cut across the entire social formation.

Especially for those of us who were born and/or grew up in the Reagan and Bush I eras, the self of self-care was the form of selfhood that hegemonic institutions taught us to internalize. This is not to say that there is nothing of value to be found in the language of practice of self-care. It is to suggest, rather, that self-care is not simply a form of struggle but the outcome of various struggles that have played out on a larger scale than we tend to acknowledge when we speak of it. This struggle involved, among other things, the disqualification of initiatives by the radical labor movement to establish universal health care as a right rather than a “benefit” restricted to and contingent upon employment in certain sectors. It involved the marginalization of years of efforts by the Black Panther Party and the National Welfare Rights Organization both to establish community clinics and to redefine health care not as a commodity but as both a fundamental question of justice and a condition of community self-determination.[4]

With all of this said, what do we make of this Audre Lorde quote?: “Caring for myself is not self-indulgence, it is self-preservation, and that is an act of political warfare.” It is both thrilling and affirming, I think, to sit with the possibilities of redefining self-care as though it were going on the political offensive. This may especially be the case in a context where the dominant meaning of “care” either has become industrialized in such a way that it consolidates (instead of contests) one’s'alienation from her conditions of existence, or from the means necessary to inform herself about, determine, and pursue the course of care and wellbeing that she needs.

But what I think is especially important about this now regularly cited quotation is what comes before the first comma, what comes before, that is, the moment when self-care finds its euphemistic, sunny resolution as “political warfare”: the disavowal of self-care as “self indulgence.” What, after all, is wrong with self-indulgence, with stealing time to enjoy the self, to pursue ways of being and living that are not necessarily productive, even if to do so is to steal away from the justifiably voracious appetites of left political desire? Lorde’s rewriting of self-care as political warfare seems to me to be symptomatic of a philosophy of movement building that has an unacknowledged investment in surveilling the behavior of its members (and demanding that they surveil themselves), a philosophy that is so deeply committed to the idea that everything is political that it cannot see the ways it enforces that definition through the implicit demand that its members justify all their behavior on its terms. Everything is political, in other words, can be a particularly disciplinary and disciplining definition of the political because of the way that it privileges a kind of ruthless scrutiny, assessment, and justification of one’s behaviors on the basis of whether or not they generate political value. At the same time, it tends to regard the political less as a contestation over social transformation than as the sum total of “good” or “bad” political behaviors.

At worst, everything is political can privilege a kind of left version of austerity logic, one that calls implicitly for the abstention from behaviors that don’t serve the Higher Purpose of generating and assessing individual behavior in the form of political value. It can only handle self-indulgence and extravagance when those things can be given a justifiable political form, when they can be commended or valorized, in other words, for how radical they are. It can only handle self-indulgence and extravagance, in other words, when they cease to be self-indulgent or extravagant at all, and claim, on the flip, to be productive and progressive.

Austerity logics, whether they come from the left or the right, get articulated through the bodies of black women by making certain kinds of demands on them. An important thing to understand about these demands is that they do not simply take the form of general devaluation. They do not simply take the form of the welfare queen stereotype. They can also take the form of a general overinvestment or hypervaluation—in feelings and performances of excessive admiration, deference, and high regard. They can inhabit the expectation—an expectation that, again, can have the force of a demand—that black women embody a kind of superhuman strength, or that they inherently possess an exceedingly resolute political consciousness. Unlike the bad faith that underwrites the demonization of black women as unproductive, this leftist hypervaluation of black women often takes the form of love.

Love: Killing love, perhaps. It is the kind of love that solicits a constant performance from black women, one that demands that they be endlessly productive, endlessly working, for the movement, even after death. It is for this reason that I spent some time in the last post attempting to contest the deification of Lorde: I want to make visible just how much work is implicitly called for in the desire for black women to be adequate to what is asked of them–which they very well may also want of themselves. The point is that any politics that seeks to celebrate the seemingly superhuman accomplishments of black women can become the unwitting collaborator with the entire field of the political that we might want to contest, a field in which the superhuman demands placed on black women are nothing short of murderous. The point is, while it may appear to honor the Audre Lordes (1934-1992) and the Barbara Christians (1943-2000) and the VèVè Clarks (1944-2007) and the Sherley Anne Williamses (1944-1999) with the demand that they rest in power, there may also be an ethics, if not also a justice, in insisting on their right to rest in peace.

And the point is that our discussions about self care are particularly impoverished when they fail to engage broader questions about the structure of health care, the social distribution of wealth, and the conditions in which we live and work. This is the thread I’ll pick up in the third and final installment of this piece by addressing last year’s series of debates on self-care and community care.

#### Analyses of the experience of oppression in terms of the body provide no foundation for universalism --- we must focus on the oppression created by capitalist exploitation.

Ebert 96—Associate Professor of Critical Theory at SUNY Albany [Teresa, “For a Red Pedagogy: Feminism, Desire, and Need,” Vol. 58, No. 7, p. 806-808, Emory Libraries]

[Gender modified]

But grounding pedagogy on the free expression of "desiring selves" does not produce a very productive classroom, even in its own terms. As Tompkins admits, "the course was in some respects a nightmare. There were days when people went at each other so destructively that students cried after class or got migraine headaches" (658). She passes over this quickly without any critical analysis, seeming to accept it as a natural part of people expressing their feelings. But, in fact, nurturing pedagogy raises a number of problems for a politically effective feminism. It so reifies an anti-intellectual and transsocial individualism that it supplants any social and collective knowledge with an acting-out, a performing of emotions. The reason the students' emotional outpourings are so destructive in ludic classrooms is because they have not been provided with concepts and frames of intelligibility for understanding and explaining the social constructedness, historical causes, and political situationality of their seemingly most private, unique, individual feelings and desires. This is what the socialist thinker Dorothy Healey calls asking "substantive questions about the meaning of our own experience" (58). Instead each student's feelings are considered both unique and equal to everyone else's-to question or challenge them is seen as an unleashing of violence, as a direct attack on the student herself. The nurturing pedagogical situation provides no way to understand critically, evaluate, or explain how one student's emotions and desires may be oppressive of other students-no way to understand how seemingly unique feelings participate in and reproduce unequal and unjust social relations (for a sustained discussion of the consequences of the pedagogy of pleasure as a pedagogy of the care of the self, see the "Symposium: The Subject of Pedagogical Politics/The Politics of Publication"). At best it can describe how the student "feels" about any suffering [they] may have experienced, but it is unable to explain the way the student's pleasures, desires and suffering are constructed out of the existing socioeconomic power relations. As Sue Clegg has argued

Oppression is experienced in terms of being black, or being a woman, or being Irish, or being gay, but it cannot be explained by virtue of this experience. For that we need an analysis that goes beyond experience. These oppressions ... are connected to the central dynamics of capitalist exploitation. (112)

Such knowledge, however, requires critique, and critique is largely dismissed as "attack" in nurturing pedagogy and as oppressive in erotic pedagogy; it is, in short, considered antithetical to pleasure and even to feminism itself. In fact, critique, especially feminist critiques of other feminists, is dismissed as "trashing" by Jane Gallop, Marianne Hirsch, and Nancy Miller, in the published transcript of their well-known "conversation," "Criticizing Feminist Criticism."

The new avant-garde of libidinal pedagogy is the pedagogy of the body or corporeal pedagogy with its body studies, body discourses, body criticism. Among the leading articulators of this new bodyism and corporeality-not only for feminism but for cultural studies generally-is Elizabeth Grosz in her latest work, Volatile Bodies. The specificity of the female body, its fluids, flows, differences are for Grosz the basis on which women can "develop autonomous modes of self-understanding and positions from which to challenge male knowledges and paradigms" (19).

Grosz's corporeal feminism is based on the notion of "the pure difference..., constituting all modes of materiality" (208), including subjectivity and sexed bodies. This "pure difference" is a new ludic essentialism grounded in the arche essence of an absolute, ahistorical ontological difference and articulated through discursive practices and significations. The logic is itself conflicting and indeterminate, for Grosz also asserts "a material specificity and determinateness to bodies" that "exert ... resistance . .. to the processes of cultural inscription" (190). In other words, materiality is not the historical objectivity of the structure of class antagonisms produced by labor divisions; it is that which resists inscription by language. Grosz thus replays the same ludic confusions as Judith Butler (Bodies): materiality is reduced to the "pure" (ontological and discursive) differences that "constitute" it. Thus despite all her claims for a theory of the historical specificity of "bodies-male or female, black, brown, white, large or small" (Grosz 19), Grosz erases the "real" historical, material specificity of bodies: the materiality constituted not by an abstract, "pure" (ontological or textual) difference but by the historical struggles over the relations of production and divisions of labor and property.

We see this erasure of materiality in her "experiment" with a "Deleuzian feminism" (Grosz 180) in which she deploys Deleuze and Guattari's binary of the "rhizomatic" and "arboreal" in spite of her own injunctions against dualities. The outcome of her experiment is predictable: the arboreal (the systematic understanding of society, as in historical materialism) is put aside in the interest of "rhizomatics"- a concrete, specific, discontinuous, heterogeneous description of bodies in terms of their "intensities and flows" (160-83). Bodies in such a rhizomatics are "assemblages" of differences, "fragments of a desiring machine" (167-68)-"heterogeneous, disparate, discontinuous alignments or linkages" (167). They have (and here she quotes Deleuze and Guattari directly) "neither base nor superstructure" but follow the "imperative of endless experimentation, metamorphosis, or transmutation" (167-68). Such a theory of "bodies," and thus of subjectivities, as the effects of transhistorical, endlessly metamorphosing "assemblages" of differences or "desiring machines" does not displace base and superstructure, but simply reverses them and, in a profoundly idealist move, articulates bodies only in terms of superstructural processes.

We see the idealism and oppressive class politics of this libidinal knowledge of corporeal flows, fluids, and intensities when we examine the politics of breasts. Grosz cites what she calls the "definitive phenomenological study of the experience of being/having breasts" (204), Iris Young's "Breasted Experience," as an instance of this corporeal knowledge. Deploying an "Irigarayan metaphorics of flu- ids... [that] befuddles and complicates Cartesian ontology" (Grosz 204) and deconstructing the common coding and alienating objectification of the female body, Young argues that if we

imagine the woman's point of view, the breasted body becomes blurry, mushy, indefinite, multiple and without clear identity.... A metaphysics generated from feminine desire, Luce Irigarary suggests, might conceptualize being as fluid.. .[and] would tend to privilege the living, moving, pulsing over the inert dead matter of the Cartesian world view. (Young 192-93)

In other words, a corporeal knowledge that "traces the libidinal pathway," "corporeal flows," and trajectories of fluids "across women's bodies" is seen as a liberatory deconstruction of the binaries of Western metaphysics and its alienating codings of women's bodies. But what is omitted here is the determined materiality of the body as the effect of social struggles brought about by the forces and relations of production-the divisions of labor and exploitation. Such valorized meanings are, to a large degree, the privilege of prosperity: they are class specific. They erase the laboring body, the body of need.

#### Capitalism causes environmental destruction and wars

Parr 13—Associate Professor of Philosophy and Environmental Studies at the University of Cincinnati [Adrian, *THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics*, p. 145-147]

A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it? Well it is.

It is shameful to think that massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3

The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something about the situation. Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now.

We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism.”5

#### Our alternative is to make pragmatic demands upon the state towards an anti-capitalist project through solidarity-based politics. This approach is necessary to open up space for more radical projects. Their strategy cedes political potential to conservative forces.

Harvey 15—Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York [David, “Consolidating Power,” *Roar*, Issue #0, p. 16, Fall 2015, https://roarmag.org/magazine/david-harvey-consolidating-power/]

So, looking at examples from southern Europe—solidarity networks in Greece, self-organization in Spain or Turkey—these seem to be very crucial for building social movements around everyday life and basic needs these days. Do you see this as a promising approach?

I think it is very promising, but there is a clear self-limitation in it, which is a problem for me. The self-limitation is the reluctance to take power at some point. Bookchin, in his last book, says that the problem with the anarchists is their denial of the significance of power and their inability to take it. Bookchin doesn’t go this far, but I think it is the refusal to see the state as a possible partner to radical transformation.

There is a tendency to regard the state as being the enemy, the 100 percent enemy. And there are plenty of examples of repressive states out of public control where this is the case. No question: the capitalist state has to be fought, but without dominating state power and without taking it on you quickly get into the story of what happened for example in 1936 and 1937 in Barcelona and then all over Spain. By refusing to take the state at a moment where they had the power to do it, the revolutionaries in Spain allowed the state to fall back into the hands of the bourgeoisie and the Stalinist wing of the Communist movement—and the state got reorganized and smashed the resistance.

That might be true for the Spanish state in the 1930s, but if we look at the contemporary neoliberal state and the retreat of the welfare state, what is left of the state to be conquered, to be seized?

To begin with, the left is not very good at answering the question of how we build massive infrastructures. How will the left build the Brooklyn bridge, for example? Any society relies on big infrastructures, infrastructures for a whole city—like the water supply, electricity and so on. I think that there is a big reluctance among the left to recognize that therefore we need some different forms of organization.

There are wings of the state apparatus, even of the neoliberal state apparatus, which are therefore terribly important—the center of disease control, for example. How do we respond to global epidemics such as Ebola and the like? You can’t do it in the anarchist way of DIY-organization. There are many instances where you need some state-like forms of infrastructure. We can’t confront the problem of global warming through decentralized forms of confrontations and activities alone.

One example that is often mentioned, despite its many problems, is the Montreal Protocol to phase out the use of chlorofluorocarbon in refrigerators to limit the depletion of the ozone layer. It was successfully enforced in the 1990s but it needed some kind of organization that is very different to the one coming out of assembly-based politics.

From an anarchist perspective, I would say that it is possible to replace even supra-national institutions like the WHO with confederal organizations which are built from the bottom up and which eventually arrive at worldwide decision-making.

Maybe to a certain degree, but we have to be aware that there will always be some kind of hierarchies and we will always face problems like accountability or the right of recourse. There will be complicated relationships between, for example, people dealing with the problem of global warming from the standpoint of the world as a whole and from the standpoint of a group that is on the ground, let’s say in Hanover or somewhere, and that wonders: ‘why should we listen to what they are saying?’

So you believe this would require some form of authority?

No, there will be authority structures anyway—there will always be. I have never been in an anarchist meeting where there was no secret authority structure. There is always this fantasy of everything being horizontal, but I sit there and watch and think: ‘oh god, there is a whole hierarchical structure in here—but it’s covert.’

Coming back to the recent protests around the Mediterranean: many movements have focused on local struggles. What is the next step to take towards social transformation?

At some point we have to create organizations which are able to assemble and enforce social change on a broader scale. For example, will Podemos in Spain be able to do that? In a chaotic situation like the economic crisis of the last years, it is important for the left to act. If the left doesn’t make it, then the right-wing is the next option. I think—and I hate to say this—but I think the left has to be more pragmatic in relation to the dynamics going on right now.

More pragmatic in what sense?

Well, why did I support SYRIZA even though it is not a revolutionary party? Because it opened a space in which something different could happen and therefore it was a progressive move for me.

It is a bit like Marx saying: the first step to freedom is the limitation of the length of the working day. Very narrow demands open up space for much more revolutionary outcomes, and even when there isn’t any possibility for any revolutionary outcomes, we have to look for compromise solutions which nevertheless roll back the neoliberal austerity nonsense and open the space where new forms of organizing can take place.

For example, it would be interesting if Podemos looked towards organizing forms of democratic confederalism—because in some ways Podemos originated with lots of assembly-type meetings taking place all over Spain, so they are very experienced with the assembly structure.

The question is how they connect the assembly-form to some permanent forms of organization concerning their upcoming position as a strong party in Parliament. This also goes back to the question of consolidating power: you have to find ways to do so, because without it the bourgeoisie and corporate capitalism are going to find ways to reassert it and take the power back.

What do you think about the dilemma of solidarity networks filling the void after the retreat of the welfare state and indirectly becoming a partner of neoliberalism in this way?

There are two ways of organizing. One is a vast growth of the NGO sector, but a lot of that is externally funded, not grassroots, and doesn’t tackle the question of the big donors who set the agenda—which won’t be a radical agenda. Here we touch upon the privatization of the welfare state.

This seems to me to be very different politically from grassroots organizations where people are on their own, saying: ‘OK, the state doesn’t take care of anything, so we are going to have to take care of it by ourselves.’ That seems to me to be leading to forms of grassroots organization with a very different political status.

But how to avoid filling that gap by helping, for example, unemployed people not to get squeezed out by neoliberal state?

Well there has to be an anti-capitalist agenda, so that when the group works with people everybody knows that it is not only about helping them to cope but that there is an organized intent to politically change the system in its entirety. This means having a very clear political project, which is problematic with decentralized, non-homogenous types of movements where somebody works one way, others work differently and there is no collective or common project.

This connects to the very first question you raised: there is no coordination of what the political objectives are. And the danger is that you just help people cope and there will be no politics coming out of it. For example, Occupy Sandy helped people get back to their houses and they did terrific work, but in the end they did what the Red Cross and federal emergency services should have done.

The end of history seems to have passed already. Looking at the actual conditions and concrete examples of anti-capitalist struggle, do you think “winning” is still an option?

Definitely, and moreover, you have occupied factories in Greece, solidarity economies across production chains being forged, radical democratic institutions in Spain and many beautiful things happening in many other places. There is a healthy growth of recognition that we need to be much broader concerning politics among all these initiatives.

The Marxist left tends to be a little bit dismissive of some of this stuff and I think they are wrong. But at the same time I don’t think that any of this is big enough on its own to actually deal with the fundamental structures of power that need to be challenged. Here we talk about nothing less than a state. So the left will have to rethink its theoretical and tactical apparatus.

### Case

#### Their political focus on the self through survival within debate fails to challenge existing power relations created by colonization

Cheah 11 Pheng CHEAH Rhetoric @ Berkeley ’11 “Crises of Money” in Creolization of Theory eds. Françoise Lionnet, Shu-mei Shih p. 84-93

At the same time, however, Fanon's insistence on the dignity of sheer life as the necessary outcome of his analysis of colonial trauma leaves the governing motif of the classical concept of trauma intact. For whether it is a matter of mere corporeal survival or being able to lead an emotionally healthy, bearable, and less unhappy life, what is always at stake is the security of the living self**,** the organism's ability to protect itself from physical or psychical distress that comes from the outside.10 The ultimate aim of Fanon's explication is to remove the various external impositions that have led to the evisceration of black consciousness: the collective unconscious, the racialepidermal schema, the various processes of unconscious socialization of the black person as an individual, but most important, the social, political, and economic conditions of European colonialism. Black Skin, White Masks is intended to be a mirror that enables the black person to recognize himself as a universal human being so that he can be returned to the path of a normal or undistorted dialectical relation to the world.11 The important point here is that this involves the constitution of a strong consciousness that can master and bind the physical and psychical excitations impacting on it. Fanon's project is essentially one of helping the subject regain its self-mastery, power, or sovereignty so that it can return to an autonomous, normal path of development, one free of any heteronomy or subordination to an other. The fundamental principle or value governing Fanon's project thus remains that of security: the **reconsolidation** and strengthening of aninterior so that it can withstand or regulate any breaching from the outside, so that it can stem any **excessive exposure to alterity**. (Colonial) political domination or subjugation is traumatic because it causes the erosion and loss of the colonized subject's psychical self-mastery. Conversely, political and economic sovereignty or self-determination is the necessary condition for black consciousness to regain its self-mastery and health.

#### Voting aff does not refuse production --- it’s only a symbolic, feel good act that remains trapped within the university.

Wiegman 12—Professor of Women’s Studies & Literature at Duke [Robyn, *Object Lessons*, p. 214-223]

Refusing What? It is surely no surprise to find the entity that internationalization has so productively identified- the American Americanist- in a certain crisis of self-recognition. If she laughs at the prospect of pursuing happiness and if her laughter ignites a wave of shame, it is not because the topic has no intrinsic critical value, nor that the significance of its historical or cultural meaning has now passed. What "dates" the pursuit is not the pursuit itself but the progressive political narrative that underwrites American American Studies, which seeks to critically unburden the Geld from its prior nationalist attachments, especially those that have been too identified with "America" and its exceptionalist self-imaginings to manage the necessary critique of its violent imperial ambitions. From this perspective, happiness is a casualty in the field's New Americanist transformation, too weighty an emblem of nationalist self-obsession, too profoundly idealist for the grip of critique through which practitioners seek to defend themselves against the global power of their object of study. So the American Americanist must travel to Rome to pursue happiness. What (and who) does she find there? International observers armed with enough dispassion and globality to be comprehensive in the face of complicit natives, who are too overwhelmed with proximity to know what they see? Of course not. But she does find herself confronted with the critical traveler's dilemma, becoming not only more ''American" and more decisively ''American Americanist," but more curious about the practices through which she is learning to become what others already take her to be- and more interested too in what they, at such a distance, may not find compelling about the institutional, political, and epistemological entanglements in which she finds herself All this, even as she also knows that the multiple and disparate relationships in which she and others are made-along with the production and circulation of their objects of study- are never entirely comprehensible, and not simply because there are no perspectives on them that are not also produced from within them. From the vantage point of Object Lessons, the problem has to do with the difficulty of negotiating the present as much as with the enormity of accounting for the ways in which knowledges, like their practitioners, are situated in a range of differentially produced geopolitical and analytic relations, ones so dense they are difficult to fully imagine, let alone enumerate. 24 From this perspective, internationalization begs the question of whether the Geld transformation it heralds is about catching up to a present that has already transformed us or producing a relation to the future that can rescue us from what seems like the present's characteristic incoherence. (Why else do so many narratives about the present rely on the idea that it is more complex than any historical present before it?) Field transformation is routinely caught in this temporal dilemma, so much so, it seems to me, that part of the fantasy that propels it is that practitioners are the agents of field revision- this, instead of the more fateful supposition that changes in the narrative formation and critical priorities of fields of study are generated by the very processes critics hope to decipher and transform. After all, it is not simply out of nowhere that scholars have learned to read the imperial power of "America" onto the field's critical relations, such that renderings of hierarchy, discrimination, and complicity in critical practice have come to stand as politics writ large. This is one of the distinctive marks of New Americanism's own production as an identity knowledge, as the critique of the Cold War consensus model was effected precisely by locating the question of politics at the level of the critical relationship. In learning to situate itself, in wish if not always in fact, as resolution to that which it critiqued, New Americanism became relentlessly focused on differentiating its critical act from the power of its object of study. It is this field imaginary that generates the paradox I am trying to track: where the charge of U.S.-centrism and provincialism can remain unintelligible to New Americanism at the same time that the refusal of identification that grounds the internationalist critique is fully at home as a critical maneuver within American American Studies itself. To explicate how this paradox is produced and sustained, I want to delve more fully into the repudiative operations of New Americanism, as the identificatory refusal the field cultivates does not belong to it alone. In fact, throughout the U.S. university today, scholars rely on refused identification to generate a critical practice that evokes their commitment to academic knowledge production as a realm not of neutral or dispassionate observation but of political engagement. 25 It might be true to say that refused identification was first deployed as a tactic for revisionary work in disciplines that had long claimed to be universalizing and objective, even as they routinely occluded both the specificity and the diversity of the human subject in gendered, racial, sexual, and economic terms. It is certainly true to say that whole generations of scholars have now been trained to practice refused identification as the means by which they challenge the normative assumptions of their disciplines, undoing canons, transforming methodologies, and resisting not simply particular disciplinary histories but the privileges such histories ascribe to specific critical vocabularies and habits of thought. Think here of the deliberative refusals of the "critical humanities," which have dismantled universalizing ideas of Western masterworks and the hierarchies of "civilization" and authorial intention that have accompanied them. Or of cultural studies, which refuses to grant value solely to aesthetics and its mode of understanding culture as high art by turning to everyday life and the complex agency that renders meaning productive, not merely consumptive. In numerous interdisciplinary projects-from postcolonial studies to Ethnic, Women's, and Sexuality Studies-refused identification has provided the founding gesture, differentiating objects, analytics, and critical habits from those privileged by dominant organizations of knowledge. This does not mean that such knowledges have not also produced their own identificatory practices; indeed, part of what refused identification performs is the transference of identification away from the priorities of the dominant model toward the dispossessed identities and categories of analysis that it is taken to have implicitly or explicitly ignored. These transferences not only transform the field in question by making both legible and legitimate new objects of study, methodological priorities, analytic practices, and critical questions, but they establish an oppositional political imaginary through which practitioners understand their scholarship as socially significant, if not ethical and just. In U.S. American Studies, refused identification has been the primary response to the purported exceptionalism of the Cold War object of study, opening scholarly investigations to a range of people, practices, and critical questions previously subordinated, if not conceptually excluded. 26 The now-generic narration of the New American Studies as an outcome of the counter hegemonic logics and ambitions of social movement dissent in the 196os is critical to the refusal the field performs, as it establishes an origin for the field that is external to both the U.S. university and the state apparatus of which it is a part. But the consolidation of New Americanism as the Cold War successor did not take shape in the immediate aftermath of social movement dissent. Tellingly, its narrative began to emerge in 1988, a few short months before the world historical event that would mark the end not simply of a geopolitical era but of living alternatives to capitalism and its global pursuit. In his review essay "Whose American Renaissance?" Crews would register the critical turn by deploying the neologism "New Americanist," and in the next few years, others would generate field-defining statements that countered or differently refracted the critical present that Crews lamentedY Robert Berkhofer Jr.'s essay in 1989, a longer version of a paper he delivered at the American Studies Association meeting in 1988, put forward the idea that there was a "new approach to American Studies, if not a new American Studies."28 His essay supported the emergence of a new set of priorities: of ethnic and gendered differences over homogeneous national identity, dissensus over consensus, everyday life over aesthetic practice, and interrogations of culture over political history and the official narratives of the state. But Berkhofer was cautious, as the question mark in his title, "A New Context for a New American Studies?" suggests, about whether the new scholarship was developing an equally new critical capacity to handle the complexities of the relationship between text and context on one hand and past and present on the other. Would it, he wondered at his essay's end, be as theoretically sophisticated in its historical narration as it was in its analysis of the social construction of "reality"? Or would it revamp the field in vocabulary and self-narration without substantively transforming the dominant habit of converting "the past into present use"?29 The answers to his questions seem not to have been extensively debated, perhaps because Crews's essay, cast as a review of seven recently published works of Americanist scholarship, was so negatively inclined toward the New Americanism it named and so prominently published (in the twentyfi fth anniversary issue of the New York Review of Books) that it generated immediate repudiation.30 (The ending was especially acerbic: "The New Americanists," Crews wrote, are "destined to become the next establishment in their field. They will be right about the most important books and the most fruitful ways of studying them because, as they always knew in their leaner days, those who hold power are right by definition.") By the spring of 1990, Donald E. Pease had collected a set of new essays and published an introduction to them as the now signatory statement, "New Americanists: Revisionist Interventions into the Canon."31 Pease had not one but two books under review by Crews, and a good many pages of"Whose American Renaissance?" used these works to delineate the failures of the New Americanism.32 "What chiefly marks Pease as a New Americanist," Crews wrote, "is his eagerness for moral certainties about the relation between the books and the politics he admires." In the end, Crews faulted the New Americanism for "self-righteousness," along with "its tendency to conceive of American history only as a highlight film of outrages, its impatience with artistic purposes other than 'redefining the social order,' and its choice of critical principles according to the partisan cause at hand." Pease's subsequent essay-what might properly be called the founding manifesto of New Americanism-repudiated Crews's repudiation andestablished refused identification as foundational to New Americanism's critical mode. Where Crews questioned what he saw as the New Americanist conflation of culture and politics, Pease affirmed their inextricable relation and read Crews's resistance as symptomatic of the political unconscious of the Cold War's liberal anticommunist consensus, which had operated through repression, including the repression of the historical violence of conquest. Pease thus defined the New Americanist project as linking the "repressed sociopolitical contexts within literary works to the sociopolitical issues external to the academic field," such that "questions of class, race, and gender" could be returned to the field.33 In this way, New Americanists "occup[ied] a double relation": "For as liaisons between cultural and public realms, they are at once within the field but external to it**.** Moreover, as representatives of subjects excluded from the field-Imaginary by the previous political unconscious, New Americanists have a responsibility to make these absent subjects representable in their field's past and present" (31). In Pease's hands, Crews's essay became not only an ungenerous attempt to reclaim the field for the Cold War consensus but a politically inflected psychic map of the ideological crisis that the New Americanism had already effected-one that did more than forward a set of new texts or critical questions. Indeed, for Pease, the New Americanism was an interruption of the field imaginary that had become dominant in the 1950s and that underwrote the institutional consolidation of American Studies in the U.S. university during the postwar period. It exposed the field's "fundamental syntax-its tacit assumptions, convictions, primal words, and the charged relations binding them together" (n). While Crews was unable to register the identifications that had come to legitimate his own authority as a practitioner within the field imaginary that governed him, Pease's refusal of identification with it both demanded and made possible the narrative transformation of the field that his essay celebrated as New American Studies. But how exactly did the New Americanist gain critical insight into the Cold War field imaginary without becoming subsumed by the "fundamental syntax" its critique put into place? Or more to the point, what enabled Pease to herald New Americanism as the alternative to the Cold War formation of the field without worrying about its own disciplinary determinations? After all, in Pease's definition, "A field specialist depends upon th[e] field-Imaginary for the construction of her primal identity within the field. Once constructed out of this syntax, the primal identity can neither reflect upon its terms nor subject them to critical scrutiny. The syntactic elements of the field-Imaginary subsist instead as self-evident principles" (n-n). In these terms, a field practitioner is immune to knowledge of the identifications that compel her because disciplinarity is the effect of the unconscious operations of the field imaginary. For this reason, Pease cast the New Americanist as "at once within the field yet external to it," which gave practitioners the ability to not only narrate but inhabit the conscious political intentions that defined it (31). Hence when a New Americanist "makes explicit the relationship between an emancipatory struggle taking place outside the academy and an argument she is conducting within the field, the relationship ... can no longer be described as imaginary. Such realized relations undermine the separation of the public world from the cultural sphere" (r9). From a position of exteriority, then, the New Americanist project refuses identification with its predecessor's imperial object of study in order to claim the political force of social movement as its own critical agency. In doing so, Pease figured the significance of New American Studies as nothing less than the means to "change the hegemonic self-representation of the United States' culture" (32). There is, of course, much to say about the political desire that underlies New Americanist claims-the desire, that is, to retrieve the repressed interiority of the field's Cold War imaginary without risking complicity with it or with the ideological sphere in which "America" might be said to secure its imperial and universalizing self-definition. To be situated in the mobility of "outside/in," as Pease called it, enabled the New Americanism to assert its authority for field transformation from within the political imaginaries established by social movements, thereby placing it outside the field of American Studies-or in contemporary terms, outside American American Studies, conceived not as a territorial or identity formation but as the field's fundamental syntax in the Cold War period. Because the terms of that syntax are inexplicable to the subject constructed within it, "an Americanist," Pease writes, cannot delineate "uncritically held assumptions without disaffiliating himself from the field of American Studies" (3). He must, in other words, be outside the field in order to have analytic purchase on what lies inside its dominant logics. While critics might take issue with the psychoanalytic vocabulary (of primal scenes, repression, and trauma) by which Pease delivers New Americanism to this complex location, most U.S.-based Americanist scholarship produced in the last two decades is beholden to the double relation that Pease defined, which not only casts critical practice as an alternative political agency but rejects the possibility that a new disciplinary apparatus guides it. The consequences of these investments on American Studies today are far reaching, especially given the fact that New American Studies has established its authority, as Crews predicted, as the dominant formation of the field in the United States. As preamble to understanding how refused identification underwrites the discourse of internationalization that shapes the present, I want to devote the next section to reflecting on some of the most prominent trajectories of scholarship that might now be said to have resituated U.S.-based American Studies within the field imaginary that New Americanism defines. In their collective turn away from the Cold War project of the fieldthrough questions of empire, transnationality, borders, and diaspora, and in critical frameworks aligned with postcolonial, postnational, hemispheric, and comparative studies-each of these trajectories takes its externality to the nationalist "Americanness" of American Studies as the means to found its own critical and political self-definition. Their use of refused identification is profoundly a self-conscious maneuver, one aimed at disarticulating field practices from what are generally considered past complicities with an exceptionalist object of study and a field imaginary in service, not resistance, to the state. Each trajectory thus marshals the utility of its own in- vestigations and critical attachments as a committed formulation of the lefit politics of the field, and each perceives itself, often quite explicitly, as essential to current critical efforts to attend to what has been called the "worlding of American Studies."34 Understood less as a cartography of new subject orientations in the field than as a remapping of its political desires, these trajectories demonstrate how familiar internationalization is as an idiom within the New Americanist field imaginary and thus prepare the way for considering the paradox that internationalization's own turn to definitive self-narration entails: being at once a discourse aimed at getting outside the Americanness of American Studies at a time when the dominant field imaginary in the United States understands itself to be committed to precisely the same thing.

# 1nr

**Semiotics is our link – analyzing experience obscures the conditions that mediate oppression --- this disproves their ability to win a link turn and makes the alt a prerequisite.**

B. **LOEWE**, an organizer and communicator, has served as NDLON's Communications Director, supported the Alto Arizona work against SB 1070 and Sheriff Arpaio, and participated in the organizing of the 2010 US Social Forum in Detroit, **12** [“An End to Self Care,” *Organizing Upgrade*, October 15, 2012, http://www.organizingupgrade.com/index.php/blogs/b-loewe/item/729-end-to-self-care]

I’m going to say it. I want to see an end to “self-care.” Can we put a nail in self-care’s coffin and instead birth a newer discussion of **community care**?

As I most often hear it, self-care stands as an importation of middle-class values of leisure that’s blind to the dynamics of working class (or even family) life, inherently rejects collective responsibility for each other’s well-being, misses power dynamics in our lives, and attempts to serve as a replacement for a politics and practice of desire that could actually ignite our hearts with a fuel to work endlessly.

Talking about how we sustain ourselves, honor our personal needs, and prioritize our well-being in this brusque and brutal world is a huge advance from movement culture generations before. However, centering that conversation on ‘self-care’ devoid of our place in the collective **misses** the central point of **why** we need to care for ourselves. And that is because we must have all of our strength in place to counter the systems which, without our ability to resist and transform, without the self-preservation Audre Lorde describes, would **see us destroyed**.

Yashna Maya Padamsee, in her article Communities of Care, Organizations of Liberation, writes

“Talking only about self-care when talking about healing justice is like only talking about recycling and composting when speaking on Environmental Justice. It is a necessary and important individual daily practice- but to truly seek justice for the Environment, or to truly seek Healing for our communities, we need to interrupt and **transform systems on a broader level**.

Speaking in Phoenix, Arizona in 2009 at a rally for migrant rights, Zack de la Rocha of Rage Against the Machine said in a speech, ‘The racism and hatred we are seeing here inflicts in us a collective wound. The only way to heal from those wounds and address those assaults on our dignity is to resist.’ If injustice results in collective wounds, healing comes from collective struggle.

**Solves battle fatigue and self-care --- solidarity politics is a mode of community care that incorporates, yet exceeds the aff’s call for self-care --- constant struggle can be a source of energy, rather than drain which bypasses battle fatigue.**

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As long as self-care is discussed as an individual responsibility and additional task, it will be something that middle-class people with leisure time will most easily relate to and will include **barriers** to the lives of people **without time to spare**. It becomes one more unchecked box on a to-do list to feel bad about, an unreal expectation, or a **far-off dream**.

The **movement is my self-care** not my reason for needing it.

Don Andres awoke every morning at 5:00am to arrive at a street corner to look for work by 6:00am. He’d work a full day of heavy construction and still arrive at the 7:00pm meeting. He’d routinely fall asleep but he was there. Why? Because organizing together to improve conditions, to **create alternatives**, to band together, was the **only option** for how care could be **anything but alien** in his life as a day laborer. Being at the meeting was self-care.

Lack of care is **systemic**. Therefore resistance to those systems is the highest affirmation of care for oneself and one’s community. **Movement work is healing** work.

What self-care often misses is the reality that for the majority of people engaged in social justice movements, participation is out of **necessity**. That a **collective effort** in the form of social movement is the **highest articulation** of **caring for one’s own self** in a world designed to deny your worthiness of care. Too many people discussing self-care **overlook** the **structural barriers** that make **access** to the care they are speaking of impossible without the struggle they often discuss as the cause of their need to ‘take care of themselves.’

Even for someone like myself who has the majority of my materials needs met, I feel most alive, most on fire, most able to go around the clock, when I’m doing political work that feels authentic, feels like it pushes the bounds of authority, and feels like it is directly connected to advancing my individual and our collective liberation.

The truth is that we cannot knit our way to revolution. The issue is not that movements are taxing, because truly they are. It’s called ‘struggle’ for a reason. But they go from strain to overtaxing when we seek to fulfill our political aspirations through vehicles never meant to carry them like in non-political formations or some 501c3s.

The crisis of care is also a **crisis of organization**. Non-profits are built to do a lot of good, but they have inherent limitations that mean they are rarely built to fulfill our visions of the transformative organizing that would usher in a world where we could feel whole. Most engaged in social movements today are originally driven out of either a concrete material necessity and/or a deep connection to the wrong that accompanies inequality and a drive to make it right. However the majority of organizations available to us today are designed for gentle reforms but not the fundamental transformation our spirits crave. As a result, we try to transform a model unfit to **nourish our hearts** and then treat that frustration with tonics and diets and stretches **instead** of placing our efforts in **creating a collective space** that unleashes our heart’s creative desires.

Maria Poblet of Causa Justa Just Cause once said, “Burnout is not about the amount of hours you work, it is about the amount of political clarity you have.” What that means is that there is no chance of us consistently burning the midnight oil if we don’t at our core believe what we’re working on will get us to a new day and no amount of yoga or therapy or comfort food we supplement our work with will compensate for that. However, if we can **see a better world** just over the horizon, like a marathon runner nearing a finish line, we can find **endless wells to draw upon as we work to usher it in**. I have literally gone from being in debilitating pain and only being able to accomplish three hours of work each day to working 18 hour shifts the same week in a completely different context. The difference was not the conditions of my work. It was my connection to my purpose.

The problem with self-care is that there is an **underlying assumption** that our labor is draining. The deeper question is how do we shape our struggles so that they **are life-giving** instead of energy-taking processes. When did activities that are aimed to move us closer to freedom stop moving us?